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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
"[A] relatively small investment today is far wiser than
spending vast amounts in the future to restore ecosystems,
agriculture and infrastructure.... [T]he time to act on carbon is
now."i
INTRODUCTION
On October 14, 2004, a coalition of thirty U.S. business, non-
profit, and energy policy organizations wrote a letter to President
Bush expressing concern that the American economy will ultimately
suffer as a result of the United States rejecting the Kyoto Protocol.2
The organizations lament that they and others "'will be cut out of
the new carbon trading markets'" set up in London and that
"'incentives to install renewables and other clean technologies in
the treaty will give companies in Europe and elsewhere a financial
advantage in joint trading agreements with former Eastern Bloc
and developing countries.'"3
Approximately one year earlier President Bush received a
different letter regarding global climate change, this time sent by
a nationwide coalition of scientists.4 The letter confirmed "the
consensus opinion of the scientific community" as one fully support-
ing the findings by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and the National Research Council (NRC).' Anthropogenic
climate change is underway, and "[elven under mid-range emissions
1. Brian DeBose & Bill Sammon, Global-Warming Limits Rejected, WASH. TIMES, June
23, 2005, at Al (quoting Senator Daniel K Akaka, Hawaii Democrat, arguing for action on
global climate change during the summer 2005 legislative session).
2. Pamela Najor, U.S. Economy Put at Risk by Failure To Implement Kyoto Pact, Bush
Told, 27 Intl Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 827-28 (Oct. 20, 2004).
3. Id. at 827 (quoting the letter sent to President Bush).
4. Letter from U.S. Scientists to the U.S. Senate (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Scientists'
Letter], available at http/www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global-warmingfflE-STATE_
OFCLIMATESCIENCE_2.pdf.
5. Id. at 1; see also Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus
on Climate Change, SCIENCE, Dec. 3, 2004 (noting that the "IPCC is not alone in its
conclusions" and that major scientific bodies "have issued statements in recent years
concluding that the evidence for human modification of climate is compelling"); U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Global Warming, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content
aboutthesite.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) ("The United States has based its climate change
policies on the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which
has provided an authoritative international consensus on the science of climate change.").
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assumptions, the projected warming could cause substantial
impacts in different regions of the United States, including an
increased likelihood of heavy and extreme precipitation events,
exacerbated drought, and sea level rise."' The letter highlighted
that late-twentieth-century climate warming fails to appear on
computer simulations that include only natural climate forces like
volcanic emissions and solar activity, but does appear on computer
simulations that include anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.7
Given the broad scientific consensus regarding human-induced
climate change and the belief among some sectors of the U.S.
economy that engaging in an international effort to reduce climate
change will benefit both the environment and the economy, what is
stopping the United States from leading the world in this effort?
The answer to this quandary may prove more complicated than it
appears. Uncertainty as to what is required by law and conflicting
policy preferences over emissions regulations have resulted in a
haphazard national approach to anthropogenic climate change. This
Note argues that from a legal perspective the United States is, and
will remain, out of compliance with its international legal obliga-
tions until good-faith efforts toward reducing domestic greenhouse
gas emissions are administered. In the interim, stalling such an
effort may actually prove harmful to U.S. businesses, which are ill-
positioned to compete in a carbon-constrained world.
Part I introduces the reader to mainstream scientific analyses of
global climate change, as well as counterarguments regarding the
impact of greenhouse gas emissions. Part II studies international
efforts to address climate change, examines U.S. reactions to these
international efforts, and discusses the present course of U.S. policy
in the climate change arena. Part III evaluates the U.S. legal
obligations assumed under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and posits that the Bush
administration's goal of merely slowing the rate of projected
greenhouse gas increases is incongruent with the nation's duty to
actually decrease output. Part IV considers several domestic
alternatives to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol by which the country
6. Id. "Anthropogenic" means "of, relating to, or resulting from the influence of human
beings on nature." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 53 (lth ed. 2003).
7. Scientists' Letter, supra note 4, at 2.
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might meet its international obligations. Finally, Part V assesses
market reactions to scientific predictions and international actions,
concluding that U.S. industries have a strong mid-term economic
interest in reducing emissions and diversifying production.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
The National Academy of Sciences reported that during the past
century the mean surface temperature of the Earth rose by about
one degree Fahrenheit.' Solar energy is the driving force behind the
Earth's climate; atmospheric greenhouse gases such as water vapor,
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone trap some of the
solar energy that otherwise would be reflected back into space by
the Earth's surface.9 This natural phenomenon is critical to the
Earth's function as a life-support system for existing species,
including human beings.'" The twentieth-century temperature
increase, however, represents the largest spike in climate warming
that has occurred in the past 400-600 years." To add context to the
seemingly slight one degree Fahrenheit change in global tempera-
ture this past century, note that the last ice age averaged just a
three- to five-degree difference from present mean temperatures. 12
Physical changes worldwide lend support to the temperature record
data:
mountain glaciers the world over are receding; the Arctic ice
pack has lost about 40% of its thickness over the past four
decades; the global sea level is rising about three times faster
over the past 100 years compared to the previous 3,000 years;
8. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Global Warming: Climate, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
globalwarming.nsf/content/Climate.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming Is Real and Underway,
http://web.archive.org/20041101195414http://www.ucsusa.org/global-environment/global
_warmingindex.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
12. Paul Kevin Waterman, Note, From Kyoto to ANWR: Critiquing the Bush
Administration's Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 13 TRANSNATL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749, 751 (2003) (providing data on
global mean temperatures as they relate to the last ice age). Thus, from the perspective of
human evolution, a numerically slight deviation from present climatic conditions could
engender dangerous results. See id.
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and there are a growing number of studies that show plants and
animals changing their range and behavior in response to shifts
in climate.13
Although naturally occurring emissions from plant respiration and
decomposing organic matter contain more than ten times the
carbon dioxide released by anthropogenic activity, natural emis-
sions have historically struck a delicate balance with the absorption
capabilities of terrestrial vegetation and the oceans.14 Scientists
generally agree that anthropogenic activities since the beginning of
the industrial revolution-primarily the combustion of fossil
fuels-are responsible for the increased concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, and that this increased concentration is
responsible for the accelerated rate of climate change. 5
A study on climatic warming in the Arctic, commissioned by the
United States and seven other nations, reported that human-
induced climate change will accelerate over the next century,
"'contributing to major physical, ecological, social and economic
changes, many of which have already begun.'" 6 The report listed
many probable harms resulting from melting glaciers, including a
shorter oil and gas drilling season, "'devastating consequences for
polar bears, ice-living seals and local people for whom these animals
are a primary food source,'" and rising sea levels worldwide. 7 Along
13. Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 11.
14. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 8.
15. See id. Deforestation and general land-use changes also account for increased
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. Id.
16. Andrew C. Revkin, Warming Trend in Arctic Is Linked to Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2004 (quoting the report). Anthropogenic climate change primarily results from carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
17. Id. (quoting the report). On December 7, 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
(ICC) filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to hold the
United States-the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter-responsible for violating the
Inuit's human rights by failing to take remedial actions to address the impacts of climate
change in the Arctic. Press Release, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Inuit Petition Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights To Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United
States of America (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http'//www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.
php?ID=316&Lang=En (petitioning"the Commission to declare the United States ofAmerica
in violation of rights affirmed in the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and other instruments of international law" and asking that the United States impose
mandatory limits on its greenhouse gas emissions); see also Ken Conca, Environmental
Governance After Johannesburg: From Stalled Legalization to Environmental Human
Rights?, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 121, 135-36 (2005).
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the same vein, the 2001 report on climate change science issued by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 8 found
that some natural systems will be irreversibly damaged by climate
change, resulting in species extinctions and biodiversity loss;
human systems and human health are also vulnerable to climate
change, particularly in coastal and impoverished states. 9 The
report concluded that rising sea levels and "large-scale (continental
or global), irreversible changes in Earth systems resulting in
widespread and sustained impacts cannot be ruled out," and
adaptation "will incur costs and will not prevent all damages."" The
IPCC is recognized by the United States as the preeminent
objective scientific international body responsible for providing the
most current knowledge available on global climate change.2' The
IPCC found that today's carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration
is the greatest in 420,000 years, and probably the greatest in
twenty million years.22 The United States is the largest producer of
greenhouse gases in the world, responsible for about 25% of global
carbon dioxide emissions.23
As part of its commitment as a party to the UNFCCC, which was
established at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) (also known as the Rio Earth Summit),
the United States submitted the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002
to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.24 The portion of this State
Department report outlining key regional vulnerabilities and
18. The IPCC was formed in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Program and the
World Meteorological Organization to be the foremost international scientific authority on
global climate change. See John C. Dernbach, Toward a Climate Change Strategy for
Pennsylvania, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2004).
19. Union of Concerned Scientists, Key Findings of Working Group II "Climate Change
2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability," httpJ/ucsusa.org/global-warmingscience/ipcc-
climate-change-impacts, html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5; see also S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-55, at 9
(1992).
22. Dernbach, supra note 18, at 183.
23. Gregory B. Foote, Considering Alternatives: The Case for Limiting C02 Emissions
from New Power Plants Through New Source Review, [2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,642, 10,642 (July 2004). Carbon dioxide is the most prevalent greenhouse gas. Id.
24. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT (2002) [hereinafter
U.S. CLIMATE AcrION REPORT], available at http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.
nsf/content/resourcecenterpublicationsusclimateactionreport.html.
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probable consequences of climate change for the United States
follows:
Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest -Rising temperatures
are likely to increase the heat index dramatically in summer....
Appalachians - Warmer and moister air is likely to lead to
more intense rainfall events in mountainous areas, increasing
the potential for flash floods.
Great Lakes - Lake levels are likely to decline due to
increased warm-season evaporation, leading to reduced water
supply and degraded water quality. Lower lake levels are also
likely to increase shipping costs .... Shoreline damage due to
high water levels is likely to decrease, but reduced wintertime
ice cover is likely to lead to higher waves and greater shoreline
erosion.
Southeast - Under warmer, wetter scenarios, the range of
southern tree species is likely to expand. Under hotter, drier
scenarios, it is likely that grasslands and savannas will eventu-
ally displace southeastern forests in many areas, with the
transformation likely accelerated by increased occurrence of
large fires.
Southeast Atlantic Coast, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands - Rising sea level and higher storm surges are likely to
cause loss of many coastal ecosystems that now provide an
important buffer for coastal development against the impacts of
storms. Currently and newly exposed communities are more
likely to suffer damage from the increasing intensity of storms.
Great Plains - Prairie potholes, which provide important
habitat for ducks and other migratory waterfowl, are likely to
become much drier in a warmer climate.
Southwest - With an increase in precipitation, the desert
ecosystems native to this region are likely to be replaced in
many areas by grasslands and shrublands, increasing both fire
and agricultural potential.
Mountain West -Higher winter temperatures are very likely
to reduce late winter snow-pack.... As the peak flow shifts to
earlier in the spring, summer runoff is likely to be reduced,
which is likely to require modifications in water management to
provide for flood control, power production, fish runs, cities, and
irrigation.
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Northwest - Increasing river and stream temperatures are
very likely to further stress migrating fish, complicating current
restoration efforts.
Alaska - Sharp winter and springtime temperature increases
are very likely to cause continued melting of sea ice and thawing
of permafrost, further disrupting ecosystems, infrastructure,
and communities....
Hawaii and Pacific Trust Territories - More intense El
Nifio and La Nifna events are possible and would be likely to
create extreme fluctuations in water resources for island citizens
and the tourists who sustain local economies.25
These data indicate that the United States is well informed of the
potentially dire implications of climate change. Several interna-
tional fora suggest the same is true for the rest of the world. At the
2003 World Climate Change Conference in Moscow, scientists from
around the globe shared studies and research, confirming that
"human activity had led to systemic changes in precipitation
patterns, ozone depletion, river runoff, plant growth, ice cover, and
sea levels."26 A June 2003 report by the United Nations concluded
that "greenhouse emissions in the developed world are likely to rise
more than ten percent over the next decade, despite regulations
designed to keep such emissions in check."27
A. Critics of Anthropogenic Climate Change
Senator Frank H. Murkowsi of Alaska, chairman of the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, arguably leads
Congress's collection of climate change critics. 2 His analysis, which
is similar to that of President Bush, recognizes that human activity
has increased the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere but
questions the link between that fact and changing climatic condi-
25. Id. at 110.
26. Sarah R. Hamilton, Comment, Developments in Climate Change, 15 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y (2003 Y.B.) 37, 37 (2004).
27. Id.
28. See Frank H. Murkowski, The Kyoto Protocol Is Not the Answer to Climate Change,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 345 passim (2000) (questioning scientific accuracy regarding human-
induced climate change and suggesting more research as part of a "no regrets" policy
approach to greenhouse gas emissions).
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tions.29 To address the potential negative consequences of climate
change, Senator Murkowski suggests focusing on research and
technological development rather than costly greenhouse gas
regulation.30 The senator feels strongly that "[i] t makes no sense for
the United States to constrain its own economic growth in an effort
to minimize the uncertain impacts of climate change."3 '
In questioning the link between anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change, Senator Murkowski cites arguments
made by S. Fred Singer, a distinguished research professor at
George Mason University and professor emeritus of environmental
science at the University of Virginia.32 Professor Singer argues
that mainstream scientific analyses of climate change rely on
models that fail to comprehend the impact of cloud systems in the
atmosphere, and that such a failure renders resulting scientific
predictions unreliable.33 He is one of the few authoritative climate
scientists in the climate change skeptic camp.34 Unapologetic
admissions that he and others in the skeptic camp accept funding
from the fossil fuel industry, however, cast doubt on the credibility
29. See id. at 348-49 (stating that "[w]e must focus research efforts on the role of natural
ecosystems and human-induced changes, such as forest management and land-use practices,
in order to better understand the carbon cycle and its role in climate change").
30. Id. at 360-61 (recognizing that because greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere
for decades, if not centuries, "[w]e must promote new technology to trap and store
greenhouse gases" that are already concentrated in the atmosphere if we are to solve the
long-term potential effects of greenhouse gas emissions).
31. Id. at 346.
32. See id. at 350 n.27.
33. See Interview by Jon Palfreman, Frontline/NOVA Producer, with S. Fred Singer,
atmospheric physicist at George Mason University and founder of the Science and
Environmental Policy Project, "a think tank on climate and environmental issues"
[hereinafter Singer Interview], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/warmingdebate/
singer.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006) (noting that although some scientists interpret cloud
systems as helping to trap heat, others view them as helping to cool the planet). Professor
Singer believes that scientific uncertainty regarding climate change results from imprecise
computer models and inconsistent research techniques. Id.
34. See, e.g., Meet the Global Warming Sceptics, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 12, 2005, at 40,
available at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mgl852 4 861.500 (noting that other
than two or three notable scientists who question climate change, most, if not all, other
skeptics can be linked financially to the fossil fuel industry, particularly to ExxonMobil, "the
world's largest oil company and an outspoken corporate opponent of mainstream climate
science").
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of sweeping policy statements against regulating industry.3 5
Additionally, Professor Singer recognizes the existence of
anthropogenic climate change; he simply believes that it is occur-
ring on a small scale and that its consequences are not necessarily
harmful.36
B. Response to the Critics
Professor Singer and Senator Murkowski both use the term
"global warming" and, to an extent, rest their theories on scientific
uncertainty regarding whether the climate is actually and abnor-
mally warming.3v The IPCC, however, has made clear that the
popular phrase "global warming" is more aptly referred to as "global
climate change," with extreme weather events resulting from even
slight increases in global mean temperatures, rather than simple,
straightforward warming.38
Further, policy arguments by climate change skeptics rely
heavily on scientific imprecision and uncertainty to support their
stance against regulation of carbon emissions.39 The fundamental
presumption, however, is flawed: although modern science cannot
precisely forecast the degree of temperature change over the next
one hundred years, there is a consensus, even among critics such as
Professor Singer, that every computer model indicates an increase
in global mean temperatures of between two degrees and nine
degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.40 There is also a consensus, even
among critics, that such change is partially attributable to human
activity.4 The international community and mainstream scientists
35. See RossGELBSPAN, THE HEATIS ON 46-49(1997) (stating that"[almong the skeptics,
Dr. S. Fred Singer stands out for being consistently forthcoming about his funding by large
oil interests").
36. See Singer Interview, supra note 33 (arguing that global warming will be beneficial
to the U.S. economy).
37. See id.; see also Murkowski, supra note 28, at 350-51.
38. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 24.
39. See, e.g., Murkowski, supra note 28, at 345-48, 357-58, 366-67 (basing his policy
suggestions regarding climate change on the idea that the impacts of climate change remain
uncertain).
40. See Singer Interview, supra note 33 (noting that there are approximately two dozen
climate models in the world that do not conclude identically, but that predict a two- to nine-
degree Fahrenheit increase in global temperatures over the next century).
41. See id.
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appear convinced that, despite variation among computer model
projections, all predictions point in the same direction, and even
data reflecting low-range estimates predict environmental impacts
that may endanger human health and welfare. This level of
consensus has proven adequate to motivate large-scale interna-
tional intervention to address the issue of climate change.
II. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE
A. The Stockholm Declaration and the Framework Convention
International environmental law is rooted in the 1972
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration), which articulates the
following principles: there is a "fundamental right to ... an environ-
ment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being," and
humans bear "a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations."42 Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration is now accepted as a substantive rule of
customary international law: "States have ... the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction."43 One hundred fourteen nations,
including the United States, participated in the Stockholm confer-
ence.
44
Twenty years later, in response to growing international
scientific concern over global climate change, the United Nations
established the UNFCCC, aiming "to achieve ... stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
42. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-
16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration, 4, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1973), available
at http://documents.un.org (follow "welcome" hyperlink; then follow "simple search"
hyperlink; then type "A/CONF.48/14" in the "symbol" field and click "search").
43. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 1267 (3d ed. 2004).
44. Id. at 1264.
20061 2099
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
climate system."45 The United States signed and ratified this
worldwide convention, which entered into force in 1994 and has
been legally binding from that time.46 Article 3 of UNFCCC contains
principles to guide participating parties, including that "[plarties
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures .... "4 Also in Article 3, the developed
member nations agreed to take the lead in mitigating anthropogenic
effects on the climate, in recognition of their responsibility to
"protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities."4" Under Article 4, parties to the convention committed
to reduce their own greenhouse gas emissions and to help develop-
ing nations do the same. 9
B. The Kyoto Protocol
Against this backdrop, more than 180 parties to the UNFCCC
met in 1997 for a formal Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto,
Japan, in order to commit to specific, numeric reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.50 The controversial Kyoto Protocol5'
emerged, legally binding participating Annex I parties (developed
nations) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions52 by specific
45. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107,31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
46. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories forLocal Solutionsfor Global Problems: State,
Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies To Mitigate the Causes and Effects of
Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 15, 17 (2004).
47. UNFCCC, supra note 45, art. 3.
48. Id.
49. Id. art. 4.
50. E.g., Denee A. DiLuigi, Comment, Kyoto's So-Called "Fatal Flaws: A Potential
Springboard for Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 693, 704
(2002).
51. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
52. The greenhouses gases referred to include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH 4),
nitrous oxide (NO), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur
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individualized percentages, with an overall result of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012."8
As a precondition for the Protocol to take effect, ratification by fifty-
five industrialized nations, representing at least 55% of total
climate change emissions was necessary.54 Russia's ratification in
November 2004 was thus critical to the Protocol's implementation.""
The Kyoto Protocol contains several procedural mechanisms to
aid signatory nations in compliance. The Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), established in Article 12, allows Annex I parties
to finance sustainable development projects in developing countries
that reduce carbon emissions and use emissions reductions
attributable to such projects to meet their own targets.56 Largely as
a result of U.S. pressure,57 the Protocol includes Article 6, which
allows parties to meet their reduction goals via the creation of
carbon sinks,58 such as reforestation projects that will collect
greenhouse gases and prevent them from concentrating in the
atmosphere. Under this Article, Annex I parties are permitted to
acquire emission reduction credits from participation in joint
projects with other Annex I parties that reduce emissions or
enhance carbon sinks.59 A party may only utilize these mechanisms,
however, in conjunction with domestic programs that contribute to
emissions reductions.60 Article 3 obligations to reduce emissions
may also be carried out through the provisions of Article 16 bis,
which permits market-based emissions trading. 1 This mechanism
raises concerns that parties can attain their emissions targets
without actually reducing their emissions, 62 but the Protocol clearly
hexafluoride (SF,). See id.; DiLuigi, supra note 50, at 705. The terms "greenhouse gas
emissions" and "climate change emissions" are denotatively identical.
53. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. 3, 1.
54. Australian Associated Press, Russia Ratifies Kyoto Protocol, CLIMATE ARK, Nov. 6,
2004, http://www.climateark.org/articles/reader.asp?linkid=36123.
55. Id. Russia accounted for 17% of carbon dioxide emissions in 1990; the United States
accounted for 36%. Id.; see also Geoffrey T. Smith, Russia To Proceed with Ratification of
Kyoto Protocol, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at A14.
56. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. 12.
57. Waterman, supra note 12, at 757.
58. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. 6.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. art. 16 bis.
62. See Waterman, supra note 12, at 757-58.
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demands that "such trading shall be supplemental to domestic
actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments."63
During the first commitment period (2008-2012) developing
nations are not required to reduce emissions,64 but because Article
7 of UNFCCC commands a formal and annual COP to assess and
develop the agreements it fosters,65 it is logical to assume that
future COPs will help the schema evolve and eventually call for
more explicit commitments from all parties. Additionally, all parties
to the Protocol, including developing nations, are committed to
update national inventories of greenhouse gases and to create
national programs to reduce the effects of climate change.6
Nonetheless, the lack of mandatory emissions reduction targets
for developing nations has been a major source of concern for the
United States and factored into the Bush administration's with-
drawal from the Protocol.67 The "bubble" option for two or more
Annex I parties to act jointly in emissions reduction is also worri-
some for the United States.68 It measures compliance as though
multiple parties are one, so if combined emissions fall within the
parties' aggregate allowable emissions, all joint participators are
deemed to be in compliance. 69 This is especially relevant and
economically beneficial to the European Community.7 °
1. The Free-Rider Problem
Using 1990 as the baseline year for measuring emissions
reductions favors several countries that, for varying reasons,
reduced their carbon dioxide emissions between 1990 and 1997.71
France, for example, reduced its emissions during that time period
63. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. 16 bis.
64. See, e.g., Tamara L. Harswick, Comment, Developments in Climate Change, 14 COLO.
J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POLY (2002 Y.B.) 25, 28 (2003).
65. See UNFCCC, supra note 45, art. 7.
66. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 51, art. 10.
67. See Waterman, supra note 12, at 758.
68. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
71. Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle,
26 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 177, 217-18 (2002).
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in part due to an increased use of nuclear power.7 2 England engaged
in a similar switch (from coal to natural gas), thereby reducing its
emissions.73 The fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in the closure of
many primitive East German power plants, reducing Germany's
emissions in the 1990 to 1995 time period by 25%."4 In Russia, the
collapse of the Soviet Union closed many power plants as well,
resulting in as much as a 38% decrease in emissions.75 Russia could
thus earn billions of dollars by selling unused greenhouse gas
quotas to countries that have exceeded their limits.76
In addition, many European countries will benefit from the joint
action mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows two or more
Annex I countries to act jointly so that each will be deemed in
compliance with its emissions reduction obligations if total
emissions do not exceed the combined levels assigned to the parties
under the Protocol.77 The European Union particularly benefits
from this mechanism because of the emissions reductions already
noted in countries like Germany, England, and France. 78 Further,
the Joint Action mechanism allows those European countries "that
face high costs in cutting back their emissions" to "buy permits or
credits from other European countries that face lower control
costs."7 '9 This creates a trade bubble that clearly favors the EU,
allowing it much greater flexibility than other parties to the
Protocol, who must abide by individual reduction standards. °
Moreover, developing countries will bear no burden to limit
greenhouse gas emissions under Kyoto.81 This could inspire a shift
of industrial production, investment, and jobs from developed to
developing countries.8 2 Developing countries also stand to benefit
72. Id. at 218 & n.256.
73. Id. at 218.
74. See id.
75. Pamela Najor, Russia's Upper House Ratifies Kyoto Pact; Putin Approval Needed for
Treaty To Be Law, 27 Intl Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 885-86 (Nov. 3,2004); Oleg Shchedrov,
Putin Signs Up Russia for Kyoto Pact, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.forests.org/articles/reader.asp?linkid=36130.
76. Shchedrov, supra note 75.
77. See BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 946 (4th ed. 2003).
78. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 71, at 223.
79. Id. at 225.
80. See id. at 226.
81. See id. at 219.
82. Id.
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from the CDM."3 Developed countries such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia would be most likely to engage in CDM
projects, as their burdens under Kyoto would be relatively high due
to increased carbon emissions in those countries between 1990 and
1997.4
On the other hand, developing countries argue that Annex I
developed countries have been primarily responsible for carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions historically, and thus
have created the very problem from which the developing countries
will suffer most." After obtaining extensive wealth through
essentially unregulated industrial development that emitted large
doses of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the United States
now refuses to participate in the only multilateral effort to address
the problem of climate change unless poor, developing countries
meet benchmarks similar to those required of developed countries. 8
Such countries might therefore argue that the free-rider problem
about which the United States complains actually occurs in the
reverse, to the advantage of the United States and other already
industrialized nationsY Given the divergent views and national
concerns regarding greenhouse gas emissions and global climate
change, perhaps the Kyoto Protocol, although far from perfect, is
the best solution that reasonably could be expected from the first
83. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
84. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 71, at 218.
85. See Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American
Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L. REV. 493, 502 (2002). Developing nations will logically
suffer most from the effects of climate change because they lack the financial resources
necessary to mitigate damages and adapt to changing climatic conditions. See Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108
YALE L.J. 677, 698-99 (1999).
86. See Wallace, supra note 85, at 501-02.
87. History is replete with examples of Western colonialism creating export economies
in the lesser developed world, resulting in virtually no industrial complex within colonized
nations. Lagging industrialization left the economies of such nations relatively primitive and
depressed. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy benefitted tremendously from rapid (and
unregulated) industrialization and inexpensive raw material imports during the late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centuries. Many lesser developed nations thus believe it is
unfair to impose costly restrictions on their ability to industrialize because the Western
world was able to develop and thrive without such restrictions and, arguably, at the expense
of the colonized world. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International
Economic Development, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209, 241-42 (1997).
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worldwide effort to combat climate change-and perhaps that was
its intention."8
2. The United States Reacts to Kyoto
Before President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the
Senate unanimously passed the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 9
dashing any hopes of immediate U.S. ratification. Byrd-Hagel
emphasized both the environmental impact of developing nations'
emissions, which "are expected to surpass" those of the United
States and others as early as 2015, and the economic impact that
free passes for developing nations could inflict upon the United
States under an international regulatory regime.9" The Senate thus
declared:
[Tihe United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to,
or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto
in December 1997, or thereafter, which would-
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless
the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same
compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the
United States .
Concerned that the executive branch would circumvent Congress
and implement Kyoto by way of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulation, Congress attached temporary budget riders to
various appropriations bills in 1998 and 1999, barring the use of
88. See Antonio Regalado & Jeffrey Ball, As Planet Heats Up, Scientists Plot Innovative
Fixes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at Al (stating that, in reality, the Kyoto Protocol "never
was intended as anything but a first step.... Most scientists believe trimming emissions by
5.2% isn't anywhere near enough to protect the planet").
89. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (1997) (enacted), available at
http://www.opic.gov/GeneralOPIC/senateresoiution98.htm.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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funds to issue regulations for the purpose, of implementing or
preparing to implement Kyoto.92
Fears associated with the President circumventing Congress and
unilaterally implementing Kyoto disappeared with the election of
George W. Bush in 2000. On July 11, 2001, from the White House
Rose Garden, President Bush referred to the Kyoto Protocol in the
past tense: "The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental
ways" due to scientific uncertainty, lack of commitments from
developing nations, and arbitrary unscientific targets that would
harm the U.S. economy.93 Months before this speech, the adminis-
tration officially withdrew the United States' signature from the
treaty.94 One year later, reneging on a campaign promise to impose
mandatory emissions reductions," President Bush unveiled his
plan for voluntary emissions reductions via the Clear Skies
legislation.96 During his remarks President Bush reaffirmed the
country's commitment to the UNFCCC and presented his adminis-
tration's goal of cutting the country's greenhouse gas intensity,
defined as the ratio between emissions and economic growth
(emissions per unit of GDP).9" This approach, the President said,
"will set America on a path to slow the growth of our greenhouse
gas emissions and, as science justifies, to stop and then reverse the
growth of emissions."98 In effect, President Bush is taking a laissez-
92. DiLuigi, supra note 50, at 709-10.
93. See Remarks on Global Climate Change, 1 PuB. PAPERS 634 (June 11, 2001).
94. See Greg Kahn, Note, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration,
21 BERKELEY J. INtL L. 548, 551 (2003) (dating the administration's withdrawal from the
treaty to March 27, 2001, when Christine Todd Whitman and Condoleezza Rice remarked
that the United States would not be implementing Kyoto).
95. See id.
96. Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Change Initiatives in Silver Spring,
Maryland, 1 PUB. PAPERS 226 (Feb. 14, 2002) (discussing the Clear Skies legislation, which
replaces mandatory regulations with incentive-based, voluntary emissions reductions).
97. Id.
98. Id. The Bush administration has been criticized by several of its own scientists for
ignoring sound science, manipulating reports before making them public, and systematically
downplaying the dangers of climate change. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the
Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1 (reporting
that "with rising intensity, scientists in and out of government have criticized the Bush
administration, saying it has selected or suppressed research findings to suit preset policies,
skewed advisory panels or ignored unwelcome advice, and quashed discussion within federal
research agencies"); Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Expert Criticizes Bush on Global Warming
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A22.
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faire approach; during the last decade, as the U.S. economy has
become less reliant on the manufacturing sector, greenhouse gas
intensity has naturally fallen even though total emissions have
steadily increased."9 In rhetoric, however, President Bush compares
his emissions plan favorably to that required of the average nation
under the Kyoto Protocol and has promised not to interfere with
the decisions of those nations that choose to participate in the
international agreement. 100 Just recently, the United States
entered into a nonbinding agreement with five Asian and Pacific
nations, including China and India, "to address the growth of
climate-changing pollution while still meeting their growing energy
needs."' It is clear, however, that the United States will not
become a party to Kyoto under the current administration.
III. ARE EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS BINDING UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A. Obligations Under the UNFCCC
Certainly the United States is not yet bound by international law
to ratify or specifically adhere to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the
UNFCCC may present another issue. Treaties are the simplest,
most straightforward way to make international law, as they are
entered into voluntarily.0 2 Under the UNFCCC, the United States
is obligated by treaty to take domestic measures to reduce green-
house gas emissions, despite a degree of scientific uncertainty and
slower progress on the part of developing nations.' 3 Thus, as a
party to an international convention whose commitments-
although general-are quite clear, the United States is technically
99. Kahn, supra note 94, at 553 & nn.37-39.
100. See John F. Temple, Note, The Kyoto Protocol: Will It Sneak Up on the U.S.?, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 213, 232-33 (2002).
101. H. Josef Hebert, China and India Among 6 Nations To Adopt Clean-Energy Pact,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 28, 2005, at 6.
102. See, e.g., Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POLY 71, 93 (1996).
103. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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bound by international law to the explicitly agreed upon action of
reducing rather than increasing greenhouse gas emissions.0 4
Further, under domestic law, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution
provides that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."105 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this language to mean that the legal status
of treaties in the United States is equivalent to that of federal
statutes.0 6 The United States is therefore bound to its obligations
under the UNFCCC by domestic law as well, unless it revokes
its signature to the treaty or passes superseding legislation. The
Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997 does not qualify as superseding
legislation because it very clearly states that its intention is to
prevent future international agreements to limit U.S. emissions
10 7
without ever implying any intention to repudiate the UNFCCC.
President Bush's reiteration of the nation's commitment to its
obligations under the UNFCCC underscores this point.'
In 2001, despite its treaty commitment, the United States
showed a net increase in emissions of 13% above 1990 levels, and
has since failed to set forth any federally mandated reductions.109
In fact, the United States rewards greenhouse gas emitters with
federal subsidies. 10 Further, the U.S. policy goal of reducing
the rate of emissions increases, rather than actually reducing
emissions-even by the slightest of margins-conflicts with the
104. Clearly, the United States is not bound to specific reduction targets under this theory,
but it is bound to create a national program aimed at reducing net greenhouse gas emissions,
per the plain language of UNFCCC. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
106. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 & n.34 (1957); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-
95 (1888).
107. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution demands that no specific emissions limitations be agreed
to after 1990, unless such limitations will not harm the U.S. economy and lesser-developed
nations also incur binding emissions limitations. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text.
108. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
109. McKinstry, supra note 46, at 25.
110. Id. at 25-26 (noting that fossil fuel tax subsidies are part of U.S. policy despite a
UNFCCC obligation for the country to "' [i] dentify and periodically review its own policies and
practices which encourage activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emissions
of greenhouse gases ... than would otherwise occur'" (alteration in original) (omission in
original) (quoting UNFCCC, supra note 45, art. IV, § 2(e)(ii))).
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plain language of the UNFCCC.' These factors support the
argument that the United States is out of compliance with the
UNFCCC, and thus in violation of its international obligations."'
B. Multilateral Treaties as Customary International Law
An analysis of customary international law, which sets forth
principles binding on all nations, further supports the argument
that the United States is out of compliance with international law.
Generally, a legal principle must be widely accepted before it is
recognized as customary international law.' 13 For a treaty to create
customary international law, and bind all nations, the treaty must
have multilateral compliance." 4 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has held that "[tihere is no doubt that this [treaty] process is
a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur" and that
"it constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new
rules of customary international law may be formed," but that it is
not to be regarded lightly."5
To reach customary status a treaty must have a sufficiently large
number of states in accession, including those most pertinent to, or
affected by, the agreement."' A strict approach to analyzing
multilateral treaty agreements as customary international law
also demands that the treaty not allow for reservations to its
provisions." 7 Although this formula tends to prevent most multilat-
eral treaties from reaching customary status, such a result is in
accord with the ICJ's hesitation to take the development of binding
international law lightly. The UNFCCC, however, meets all three
prongs of this stringent test, and thus may well be regarded as
111. Compare supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text, with supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text.
112. The United States surely would argue that voluntary programs and research funding
are enough to comply with the vaguely worded treaty directives, but such an argument
seems to defy the treaty's plain meaning.
113. See Scott & Carr, supra note 102, at 84.
114. See id. at 85.
115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See id. at 85-87 (noting a qualitative and a quantitative requirement).
117. See id. at 91-92 (noting a "no reservation" requirement).
20061 2109
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
customary international law, with its principles binding on all
nations." 8
Even without this customary status, however, as a signatory to
the UNFCCC the United States agreed to be bound without
reservation to the UNFCCC's tenets. One may therefore conclude
that the United States is obligated by both treaty law and custom-
ary international law to take good-faith action (or inaction, e.g., not
subsidizing fossil fuel emitters) to reduce net greenhouse gas
emissions." 9 A comprehensive plan to set and monitor mandatory
emission limits is probably necessary to fulfill this obligation. 2 °
IV. IF NOT KYOTO, THEN WHAT? DOMESTIC ALTERNATIVES
A. Regulation Under Existing Federal Law: Clean Air Act and
New Source Review
Arguably, there are several ways by which domestic measures
could be utilized to bring the United States into compliance with
the UNFCCC. One option may be the Clean Air Act (CAA) New
Source Review (NSR) permit program.' 2' Even if carbon dioxide, the
main greenhouse gas, is not considered a "criteria pollutant" for
purposes of CAA mandatory regulation, it can be classified as an
"unregulated pollutant" under NSR.'22 NSR demands that origina-
tors of major new sources of air pollution evaluate and mitigate the
environmental impact of their actions, including the impact from
118. See Craig L. Car" & Gary L. Scott, Multilateral Treaties and the Environment: A Case
Study in the Formation of Customary International Law, 27 DENY. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 313,
325 (1999) (classifying the UNFCCC as clearly meeting the three-part test, because most of
the world's developed states-which are the pertinent ones to this treaty-are parties, 177
states in total are parties, and the treaty does not allow reservations). Additionally, the
.precautionary principle" is present in just about every modern international environmental
protection treaty, a fact that may make delaying an absolute reduction in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions because of scientific uncertainty a violation of international
customary law. See Waterman, supra note 12, at 763.
119. The international law concept ofjus cogens-peremptory norms that protect common
interests-may provide an additional legal vehicle by which to enforce global reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions in the future. For a full analysis, see Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann,
State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing
Criteria for Peremptory Norms, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 101 passim (1998).
120. See Foote, supra note 23, at 10,642.
121. Id. at 10,643.
122. Id.
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unregulated pollutants. 123 Permit-issuing authorities may use NSR
to require, for example, that new coal-burning power plants-the
largest greenhouse gas emitters-utilize Integrated Gasification
Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology to curb emissions.'24
Economy-wide emissions regulations are also possible through
the CAA's pollution-control sections if EPA classifies greenhouse
gases as air pollutants that arise from diverse sources and may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger the general health and
welfare.'25 In a 1999 legal opinion letter, an EPA official testified
that the agency had preexisting legal authority under the CAA to
regulate carbon dioxide as a hazardous air pollutant, just as it had
authority to regulate sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury. '26
Former EPA Administrator Carol Browner maintained that EPA
has broad authority to regulate carbon dioxide under several CAA
regulatory provisions."'
According to the D.C. Circuit, the CAA defines "air pollutant"
extremely broadly.'28 Congress defined the term to include "any air
pollution agent or combination of such agents ... which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air," encompassing "any
precursors to the formation of any air pollutant."'29 Congress also
listed carbon dioxide in its delineation of "multiple air pollutants"
that require research under section 103(g) of the CAA. 3 ° To
regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA, EPA must determine that
it is an air pollutant, that its emissions stem from numerous or
diverse sources, and that its emissions "may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare."' 3 ' This seems like a
reasonable conclusion under the statute's plain language. Carbon
dioxide emissions stem from both industry plants and motor
vehicles (numerous and diverse sources) and, according to the
123. See id.
124. Id. For a technical account of this latest technology, see id.
125. See Veronique Bugnion & David M. Reiner, A Game of Climate Chicken: Can EPA
Regulate Greenhouse Gases Before the U.S. Senate Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol?, 30 ENVTL. L.
491, 502 (2000).
126. See id. at 498 n.33.
127. Id. at 499 & nn.38-40.
128. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 352 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g)(1) (2000).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
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IPCC, may fairly be anticipated to endanger human health and
welfare.132
Nevertheless, in August 2003, EPA reversed its position and
determined that carbon dioxide is not a CAA pollutant and is thus
beyond the CAA's regulatory reach.'33 The rationale: carbon dioxide
is an agent of climate change, and Congress did not intend for EPA
to address climate change under the CAA, so carbon dioxide is not
an air pollutant under the Act.3 4 In so concluding, EPA ruled
against petitions seeking such classification. 3 ' Lawsuits, adminis-
trative petitions, and state-based initiatives to curb greenhouse gas
emissions followed. 136
B. Massachusetts v. EPA
Twelve states, the District of Columbia, New York City, the
City Council and Mayor of Baltimore, the American Samoa
government, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
the International Center for Technology Assessment, and several
environmental groups jointly filed suit against EPA, challenging the
agency's denial of its authority to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles under CAA section 202.37 Section
202(a) states, in relevant part: "The Administrator shall by
regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class ... of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
132. See supra Part I.
133. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Through Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267,275 (2004). Note, however, that EPA's
determination that carbon dioxide is not an air pollutant and is beyond the regulatory reach
of the CAA is hotly contested. Judicial review of EPA's determination or a change in
administration could well lead to the opposite conclusion.
134. Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide:A Pollutant in the Air, but Is the EPA Correct
that It Is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996, 2002 (2004). Countervailing
evidence from the legislative history of the CAA suggests that perhaps Congress did consider
global climate change within the scope of the CAA. See id. at 2013.
135. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines: Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
136. See Bryner, supra note 133, at 275.
137. Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at i, 12, Massachusetts v. EPA,
415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1361), 2005 WL 257460 [hereinafter Petitioners' Briefl.
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health or welfare." 3 s "Air pollutant" is defined by section 302(g) of
the CAA as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive ...
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation of
any air pollutant."'39 "Effects on public welfare" is defined in section
302(h) as including, but "not limited to, effects on soils, water,
crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather,
visibility, and climate." 40 The plain language of the Act, with the
use of the word "shall" in section 202, seems to support the peti-
tioner's proposition that EPA has a non-discretionary duty to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, but
EPA's fall-back argument of agency discretion apparently per-
suaded the court otherwise.
EPA functioned as the lead agency in the U.S. Climate Action
Report,' 4 ' which outlined the likely impacts of climate change on
the public welfare. Nevertheless, EPA argued that as a threshold
matter, carbon dioxide is not an air pollutant for purposes of the
Clean Air Act. 4 2 It further argued that when the CAA was passed,
Congress did not intend for EPA to spearhead a massive regulation
of carbon dioxide to address the issue of global climate change, and
that legislative history of the 1990 amendments reveals that
Congress explicitly debated carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles
and voted against granting EPA authority to regulate. 14 3 Petitioners
responded that Congress's failure to pass specific, numerical carbon
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000).
141. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 24; see also text accompanying note 24.
142. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines: Notice of Denial of
Petition for Rehearing, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,52,925 (Sept. 8,2003) (adopting the position that
"the CAA does not authorize EPA to regulate for global climate change purposes, and
accordingly that CO2 and other GHGs cannot be considered 'air pollutants' subject to the
CAA's regulatory provisions for any contribution they may make to global climate change").
143. Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents at 1, 5-8, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1361), 2005 WL 257457 [hereinafter Respondent's Briefl.
EPA specifically relied on FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000),
concluding that "in light of the enormous economic and political consequences of regulating
greenhouse gas emissions, Congress would have been far more specific if it had intended to
authorize EPA to regulate the subject" under the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50, 56 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court declined to express a view on this analysis. Id.
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dioxide standards "provides no basis for concluding that EPA lacked
pre-existing authority to regulate greenhouse gases. "14 EPA then
contended that its authority to regulate pollutants that settle in
ambient air does not include carbon dioxide, which concentrates
in higher altitudes of the atmosphere. 145 Finally, the agency
argued that regulating carbon dioxide under section 202 of the CAA
would directly conflict with the more recent Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA), which itself regulates fuel economy
standards. 146 As a fall-back argument, EPA proffered that even
assuming statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
from new motor vehicles, the decision to exercise such authority
remained a matter of agency discretion.'47
In a plurality opinion supplemented by a lengthy and vigorous
dissent, the D.C. Circuit agreed with EPA's fall-back argument. 41
The court, assuming arguendo that EPA retained statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles,
addressed the issue of whether EPA properly declined to exercise
such authority.4 ' The court resolved that question in the affirma-
tive, reasoning that when an agency is faced with issues on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, a reviewing court should "'uphold
agency conclusions based on policy judgments."""5 With a splintered
holding and a well-reasoned dissent highlighting the fact that
EPA's policy judgment failed to relate to the statutory standard,15 '
this case appears ripe for Supreme Court review. 52
144. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 137, at 32.
145. Respondents' Brief, supra note 143, at 11-12.
146. See id. at 15; see also Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 72 (stating that C02 regulation by
EPA would "overlap" with the Department of Transportation's authority under the EPCA).
The EPCA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (2000).
147. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53.
148. Id. at 58.
149. Id. at 56.
150. Id. at 58 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
151. See id. at 67-69, 80-81 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that "an agency may not avoid
the Congressional intent clearly expressed in the [statutory] text simply by asserting that
its preferred approach would be better policy" (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Judge Tatel asserts that the broad, precautionary, and mandatory language
of the Act easily covers greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehicles and that to disregard
the Act's plain text, EPA must offer "extraordinarily convincing justification," a feat at which
it utterly failed. Id. at 67-69.
152. In a four-to-three decision, the D.C. Circuit denied petitioners' petition for rehearing
en banc. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In another compelling dissent,
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Motor vehicle emissions constitute 20% of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions.' 53 Thus, if the court had held for petitioners, the
resulting EPA standards for motor vehicle emissions could have
single-handedly brought the United States into compliance with its
UNFCCC obligation to reduce greenhouse emissions. More broadly,
a victory in this case for petitioners would have required a finding
that EPA acted wrongly in failing to define carbon dioxide as a CAA
air pollutant. Such a finding would theoretically have opened the
door to direct, economy-wide regulation of the substance under
sections 108 and 109, which set air quality standards for pervasive,
"criteria" air pollutants, defined as those which "cause or contribute
to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare."'54 By holding for the respondent, however,
Congress has arguably been given both the opportunity and the
obligation to develop a national program for UNFCCC compliance,
possibly by amending the CAA and laying out a clear framework for
greenhouse gas regulations.
Judge Tatel, joined by Judge Rogers, admonished that '[a]lthough Ethyl recognizes EPA's
discretion to interpret data from health risk assessments, nothing in Ethyl authorizes the
Agency to do what it did here, i.e., to ignore record evidence of impending public harm and
to refuse altogether to assess related risks." Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (referring to Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)). In fact, "EPA acknowledges not only that
automobile emissions produce greenhouse gases, ... but also that greenhouse gases in turn
contribute to climate change.... In short, EPA all but concedes that automobile greenhouse
gas emissions 'cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.'" Id.
153. Anne Klosterman, The United Nations' Agreement To Adopt Uniform Technical
Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles: An Important Step Toward International Harmonization
for Vehicle Emissions Regulations, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y (2000 Y.B.) 239, 247
(2001).
154. See Bugnion & Reiner, supra note 125, at 502-09 (laying out the statutory analysis).
Regulating carbon dioxide as a National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) pollutant
may pose practical obstacles to states' ability to comply with state implementation plans
(SIPs) due to the relatively even dispersion of carbon dioxide in the lower atmosphere. See
Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 69-70 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (referencing EPA's unworkability
argument). However, § 7509a(a) of the CAA provides a safe harbor for states that fail to meet
their NAAQS due to emissions originating from outside the country; from a practical
perspective, therefore, EPA could regulate carbon dioxide under section 202 of the Act while
functionally circumventing regulation as a criteria pollutant under sections 108 and 109
because of unworkability and the safe harbor provision. See id.
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C. State-Based Initiatives
Frustrated by the absence of serious national action to address
climate change, some states are proceeding independently.'55 As
Justice Brandeis eloquently remarked in 1932, "[uit is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."5 6 In that famous dissent, Justice Brandeis reiterated
the settled principle of constitutional law "that the police power
commonly invoked [by states] in aid of health, safety and morals,
extends equally to the promotion of the public welfare."'57
More than half of the states have utilized this power in the
climate change arena.' 8 Massachusetts issued a rule in 2001
capping carbon emissions from six high-emitting older power plants
in the state.'59 Similarly, in 2002, New Hampshire passed legisla-
tion imposing a carbon cap on power plants fired by fossil fuels,
which, by 2007, will cut carbon dioxide emissions to 7% below 1990
levels. 6 ° California enacted one of the most far-reaching climate
change bills in 2002, requiring its Air Resources Board (CARB) to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles to the
maximum extent feasible, with mandatory reductions from 2009
models and beyond.' 6 ' Oregon now requires carbon dioxide offsets
for new power plants; Vermont is under an executive order to cut
greenhouse gas emissions; and Maine is requiring state officials to
develop a climate change program that will reduce carbon dioxide
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, by an additional 10% as of 2020,
155. See Dernbach, supra note 18, at 196, 204-05.
156. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 304.
158. See, e.g., J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy
Issue for Corporate Counsel-It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 98 (2004).
159. Id.; Paul E. Hagen et al., An Overview of Federal, State, and Regional Initiatives and
Activities To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Nov. 20-21, 2003), WL SJ011 ALI-ABA 45, 52.
160. Id.; Healy & Tapick, supra note 158, at 99.
161. Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282-83 (2003) (warning that California's efforts may be stymied by
litigation claiming federal preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the
Clean Air Act); Hagen et al., supra note 159, at 52; Healy & Tapick, supra note 158, at 98-99.
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and eventually by a full 80%.112 In November 2004, Colorado voters
approved a ballot measure requiring major utilities statewide to
derive 10% of their power from renewable sources by 2015.163
Regional agreements also abound. Governors of New England
states and the eastern Canadian premiers have agreed to a climate
action plan to cap carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by
2010.16 In July 2003, ten northeastern states announced the
formation of a cap-and-trade program for power plant carbon
dioxide emissions."' Seven of those states, led by New York, have
since moved closer to actual implementation, with Maryland and
Pennsylvania agreeing to participate as observers. 6 ' On the West
Coast, California, Oregon, and Washington have pledged to
purchase more hybrid vehicles for government fleets, to encourage
renewable electricity resource development, and to coordinate
greenhouse gas inventories and standards.'67
States reducing greenhouse gas emissions report ancillary
benefits such as the creation of new jobs and businesses, techno-
logical development, and lower energy costs for homes and busi-
nesses.'68 As the urgency of climate change continues to grow, the
162. Bryner, supra note 133, at 277; Hagen et al., supra note 159, at 52.
163. Reuters, Colorado Voters Back Renewable Energy Measure, CLIMATE ARK, Nov. 5,
2004, http//cimateark.orgarticlesreader.asp?linkid=36147.
164. See Laura Kosloff& Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally,
Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 46, 47 (2004).
165. Bryner, supra note 133, at 276-77.
166. See, e.g., Alexandria Liddy Bourne, Sons of Kyoto: Greenhouse Gas Regulation in the
States 6 (unpublished manuscript presented at American Bar Association Section of
Environment, Energy, and Resources 34th Annual Conference on Environmental Law, Mar.
10-13, 2005, on file with author); Reuters, Nine US States Break with Bush on Greenhouse
Gases, PLANET ARK, Aug. 25, 2005, http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.
cfinlnewsidl32179/story.htm. On December 20, 2005, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
agreeing to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which will establish a cap-
and-trade program "to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions from the region's power plants at
current levels from 2009 to the start of 2015, followed by a 10% reduction in emissions by
2019. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding in Brief,
http://www.rggi.orgldocs/moubrief 1220-05.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2006); Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding, http://www.rggi.org/docs
moufinal_12 20_05.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
167. Hagen et al., supra note 159, at 52.
168. See Dernbach, supra note 18, at 194-95 ("[I]ronically, then, one of the most important
reasons for states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to achieve ancillary or other
benefits. These benefits have been a primary motivation for states that have already done
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market will expand, and economic rewards should compound for
states that invest in programs and technology related to renewable
energy and energy efficiency."6 9 The mushrooming of state-based
regulatory action over the past five years indicates the speed at
which change is occurring; industry would probably be wise to view
it as a precursor to federal regulation. After all, although praisewor-
thy, state-based regulations do not represent the concerted national
effort promised in the UNFCCC and thus do not bring the nation
into compliance with its international obligations.
D. Pending Federal Legislation
Since the Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997, Congress has taken
meaningful strides toward what appears to be an inevitable
regulatory regime to address climate change.7 ° Senators Jeffords
of Vermont and Lieberman of Connecticut, for example, sponsored
the Clean Power Act, legislation that has been percolating in
Congress since 2001 and that would drastically reduce nitrogen
oxides, mercury, sulfur dioxide, and carbon dioxide emissions by
2008 if implemented.' This reduction would be accomplished by
demanding that old power plants, which currently escape modern
pollution control standards through a grandfathering mechanism
in the Clean Air Act, be held to the same standards as all other
power plants. 172 It would also establish a cap-and-trade program
designed to limit emissions and encourage innovation.
73
The McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 2003
represents another mandatory, but market-based, cap-and-trade
169. See id.
170. See Bryner, supra note 133, at 274-75 (noting that Congress is expected to pass a
climate change bill in the near future).
171. See Thomas McIntosh, Note, I Can See Clearly Now: Has the U.S. Betrayed Future
Generations with Air Quality Control Standards?, 18 J. NAT. RESOURCES &ENvTL. L. 97,109-
10 (2003); David W. Rugh, Note, Clearer, but Still Toxic Skies: A Comparison of the Clear
Skies Act, Congressional Bills, and the Proposed Rule To Control Mercury Emissions from
Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 VT. L. REV. 201, 203 (2003). Leading environmental
organizations endorse the Clean Power Act. McIntosh, supra, at 109.
172. McIntosh, supra note 171, at 109.
173. See id.
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bill modeled on the successful acid rain control program.'74
Beginning in 2010, emissions of all six greenhouse gases, including
carbon dioxide, would be capped economy-wide at year 2000
levels.'75 On October 30, 2003, the Senate rejected the bill by a vote
of 55 to 43, but the vote exhibited increasing bipartisan support for
federal regulation of greenhouse gases.'76 Indeed, a provision passed
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2003 calls for
"U.S. engagement in the development of a binding international
climate change treaty."'77 After rejecting the most recent iteration
of the Climate Stewardship Act by a vote of 60 to 38, lawmakers
"passed by voice vote a nonbinding resolution calling for Congress
to approve mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions in a way
that does not" cause significant harm to the U.S. economy. 7 '
Overall, the 107th Congress saw the introduction of more
than fifty bills and provisions from both sides of the aisle regard-
ing climate change. 79 This indicates that eventually one is likely
to stick, and mandatory emission reductions will ensue. MIT
economists performed an independent analysis on the Climate
Stewardship Act and concluded that it could cost Americans less
than twenty dollars annually per household. 0 Such studies should
help alleviate concerns regarding the economic impact of regula-
tions.
174. See Vicki Arroyo, Climate Change: A Primer (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Nov. 20-21,
2003), WL SJ011 ALI-ABA 1, 23-24 (noting that regulating acid rain precursors through a
cap-and-trade program was Congress's first attempt at market-based, rather than command-
and-control, environmental regulation).
175. See id.
176. Comm. on Sustainable Dev., Ecosystems & Climate Change, The Year in Review,
2003 ABASEc. ENVT, ENERGY, & RESOURCES 117, 123 (stating that " [o]fthe forty-three votes
in favor of the bill, six came from Republicans, suggesting rising bipartisan support for
climate change policy").
177. Hagen et al., supra note 159, at 51.
178. Justin Blum, Senate Rejects Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at
A8.
179. Healy & Tapick, supra note 158, at 97-98.
180. See SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING To REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE McCAIN-LEBERMAN PROPOSAL 26-27 (2003), available
at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC-Rpt97.pdf. Significantly, economic
analyses systematically fail to consider costs averted by emissions control programs.
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V. THE MARKET'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: CONCERNS FOR THE
ECONOMY IN THE ABSENCE OF REGULATION
If international legal obligations and the physical threat of global
climate change together fail to prompt significant formal action by
the U.S. government, perhaps the private sector will emerge as a
strange bedfellow to environmentalists and scientists. After all, as
scientific reports regarding climate change continue to grow more
specific and certain, even the rhetoric of those who sharply
questioned the reality of climate change has softened.'' Remaining
at issue among various populations is how severe the consequences
of climate change will be and how far into the future they will
manifest. Most scientists, however, conclude that atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations are higher than 370 parts per million
today; that the Earth can tolerate, at maximum, concentrations of
550 parts per million before dangerous climate reactions occur; and
that we will likely reach that point around the year 2050 "[gliven
current projections of economic growth and emissions increases. " "'2
The United Nations June 2003 report concurred, estimating "that
greenhouse emissions in the developed world are likely to rise more
than ten percent over the next decade, despite regulations designed
to keep such emissions in check."8 3
Further, assuming the absence of effective UNFCCC compliance
mechanisms, it is still unclear how members of the international
community who committed to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol will react to nonparticipating industrialized nations who
may be seen as global free-riders. Beyond the availability of carbon
emissions trading markets, Kyoto participants will likely create
additional incentives to join the agreement. After all, parties to the
Protocol are essentially taxing their own carbon emissions, so it
would make sense, in turn, to impose on goods imported from the
nonparticipating parties a tax proportionate to the quantity of
181. See Wallace, supra note 85, at 510.
182. Regalado & Ball, supra note 88 (recognizing that "[stabilizing atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases at 550 parts per million would require the world to cut
emissions between 55% and 85% below where they'd otherwise be by 2100").
183. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 37.
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carbon emitted in producing such goods.'" Logically, a parallel tax
on carbon exports to nonparticipating parties would complete the
scheme. 185
Accordingly, many companies are preparing for the looming need
to regulate their greenhouse gas emissions, and carbon dioxide
output in particular."6 Beyond international pressure, if scientific
concerns about climate change come to fruition, American corpora-
tions may find themselves gravely imperiled.'87 As the IPCC
Working Group II Third Assessment Report illustrates, "'Economic
sectors that support the [human] settlement [or societal setting] are
affected [by climate change] because of changes in productive
capacity (e.g., in agriculture or fisheries) or changes in market
demand for goods and services produced there (including demand
from people living nearby and from tourism).'""'8
This fundamental economic threat posed by climate change
underscores the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
requirement that public companies report material environmental
"trends and uncertainties that are likely to have a reasonable
impact on a company's operations" under Item 303 of Regulation
S-K. 89 Failure to analyze and disclose these material "trends and
184. See David Zachary Kaufman, Comment, The Greenhouse Effect:Available and Needed
Laws and Treaties, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 219, 243 (1991). Potential conflicts with
free trade agreements are beyond the scope of this Note. Should parties to Kyoto agree to
this type of tax imposition, however, they might represent enough of the global economy to
force the United States to engage in negotiations, despite a potential future World Trade
Organization decision permitting sanctions.
185. See id. (discussing possible international compliance and enforcement mechanisms
to prevent the free-rider problem by encouraging "reluctant participants to join in any
agreement to limit carbon emissions").
186. In addition to market pressures and probable regulation, companies and their
directors/officers that fail to address climate change may find themselves subject to tort and
other liability. For an interesting analysis of this issue, see Healy & Tapick, supra note 158,
at 101-13.
187. See Wallace, supra note 85, at 511.
188. Id. at 511-12 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 12 (2001), available at
http://www.grida.no.climatelipcc-tar/wg2/index.htm).
189. MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, PETROCHEMICAL, AND
UTILITIES COMPANIES 1 (Sept. 2002), available at http'//www.foe.org/camps/intl/corpacct/
wallstreet/secsurvey.pdf. Line Item 303 of Regulation S-K provides: "Describe any known
trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing
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uncertainties" violates federal securities laws and could ultimately
support charges of securities fraud, resulting in significant liability.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 raises the stakes for corporate
officers and directors-who are personally liable, both civilly and
criminally-for certifying the accuracy of their companies' financial
reporting. 9 ° Yet, public companies in the same sectors (e.g.,
competing automobile companies, competing petrochemical firms)
are inconsistent as to whether and to what extent they analyze and
disclose climate change vulnerabilities in SEC filings.' 9 ' Perhaps
federal legislation regulating climate change emissions would
provide public companies with the certainty of appropriate disclo-
sure through reports of compliance with the national laws.
On the ground, companies handle the potential impact of climate
change on their operations in various ways. Some are investing in
new technologies and energy efficiency programs, not only to be
ahead of the curve when regulations become effective, but also due
to anxiety expressed by clients of major investment firms. 92
Substantial state pension funds (which are responsible for hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in investments) are exerting considerable
pressure on management to screen investments for the risks
associated with climate change.'93 In September 2004, a coalition of
seven large pension funds sent a letter to the nation's fifty largest
investment firms asking for a report on how their investments are
being defended against the risks associated with climate change:
"The potential for long term climate risk raises the possibility
that certain economic sectors may become more or less profit-
able as the environment changes, or as certain economic
activities are increasingly regulated to mitigate their climatic
impact .... Please tell us whether investment managers at your
operations." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2005).
190. See generally Latham & Watkins Env't, Land & Res. Dep't, SEC Filings and
Environmental Disclosure: The Public Spotlight Soon Could Be on You..., CLIENT ALERT
BULL. (Latham & Watkins, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 29, 2002, available at httpJ/www.lw.com/
resource/PublicationsLpdf/pub 195.pdf(discussing corporate obligations under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act).
191. See CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 189, at 6, 10, 14.
192. See, e.g., Matthew Dalton, Pension Funds Push Climate Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct.
27, 2004, at B2C (describing how investment banks' clients are demanding change and
disclosure from energy companies).
193. See id.
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firm are monitoring the impact of this risk on companies in the
portfolios they manage.194
This degree of economic pressure, despite the presence of an
antiregulation administration in Washington, D.C., suggests that
investors view greenhouse gas emissions regulations as inevitable,
with certain industries more vulnerable to profit impacts than
others. 19 With state-based legislation passed, citizen suits filed,
and an international treaty in force, this seems like a safe assump-
tion.
On the global market, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
will spur new markets in technology, which may eventually harm
U.S. businesses who have little incentive to compete in the short
term."'9 Some economists estimate that the "carbon market" could
reach $10 billion by 2008, when the Kyoto Protocol's legally binding
emissions reductions take force.' 97 Multinational corporations that
operate in Annex I countries will be the first U.S. businesses to
experience the regulations. When regulations do ensue, those
companies that have addressed the issue and taken steps to
mitigate the impact will enjoy a significant advantage.
A study by the World Resources Institute concluded that
proactive steps are far cheaper than reactionary ones. 9 ' This theory
is illustrated by a London-based company that gave $50,000 to two
Indian tribes in Montana for a reforestation project. 199 In return,
the company obtained credits for the 47,972 tons of carbon dioxide
that the trees are estimated to absorb over the next eighty years.
200
194. Id. (quoting the letter). In the same vein, in 2002, a group of thirty-one large
investors, including Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, wrote to the largest 500 publicly
traded companies in the world seeking information and analysis related to "possible material
impacts on investment value driven by climate change related taxation and regulation,
technology innovations, and shifts in consumer sentiment." CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 189,
at 3.
195. See CHAN-FISHEL, supra note 189, at 3 (notingthat energy companies, among others,
could be viewed as risky investments because of the potential for regulation).
196. See Waterman, supra note 12, at 765 (critiquing the Bush administration's economic
analysis of the Kyoto Protocol's effect on the U.S. economy).
197. See Jeffrey Ball, As Kyoto Protocol Comes Alive, So Do Pollution-Permit Markets,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at A2.
198. See John J. Fialka & Jeffrey Ball, Companies Get Ready for Greenhouse-Gas Limits,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at A2.
199. Temple, supra note 100, at 249.
200. Id.
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With a ton of greenhouse gas emissions estimated to be worth $70
or more one day, this exchange could result in a $3 million profit for
the corporation. 2 1 Thus, the Kyoto Protocol's CDM compliance
program promises to play a key role in wise carbon investing. °2
Financial models predict "a very large demand for CDM credits"
and that "the cheapest CDM projects will likely be taken first by
Kyoto signatories and their companies, leaving U.S. companies at
a competitive disadvantage if they later become interested in using
CDMs as an emissions hedge." °3 If and when the United States
moves toward a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program, cost-
effective CDM projects in developing countries will be critical for
comfortable compliance by industry.0 4
Some major corporations that operate in the U.S. have thus
determined that emissions reductions should begin now, and have
announced targets that exceed those required by the Kyoto
Protocol. 2 5 DuPont, for example, intends to reduce its emissions to
65% below 1990 levels by 2010, partly by increasing its use of
renewable energy by 10%.206 L'Or6al managed to increase produc-
tion by 60% between 1990 and 2000 while simultaneously reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by 44% and maintaining its status as the
world's largest cosmetics manufacturer. 2 7 Kodak reduced carbon
dioxide emissions by 17% between 1999 and 2003, and is committed
to reducing emissions by another 10% between 2004 and 2008.0
General Electric is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on clean
energy technology, and Consolidated Edison, Inc. has already saved
201. Id.
202. See supra Part II.B.
203. Latham & Watkins Env't, Land & Res. Dep't, Overview of the Process for Obtaining
Carbon Credits Under the Clean Development Mechanism, CLIENT ALERT BULL. (Latham &
Watkins, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://www.lw.com/resource/Publications/
_pdfpub1221_1.pdf.
204. See id.
205. Waterman, supra note 12, at 765 (listing Boeing, IBM, Shell, Amoco, BP, and Toyota
as members of the Business Environmental Leadership Counsel of the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, which foresees Kyoto targets as only the first step in emissions reductions).
This list is not exhaustive.
206. Id.
207. Bryner, supra note 133, at 281 (noting that L'Oreal accomplished this feat through
energy conservation programs).
208. Id.; Donna Timmons, Worldwide Director of Health, Safety, and Environmental
Affairs, Kodak Commitment To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, http://www.kodak.
comi/US/en/motion/hse/greenhouse'jhtml.
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millions by investing in the elimination of natural gas leaks. 20 9
Other companies, such as Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer Inc., and
Citigroup, are preparing for expected regulations by investing in
high-end technology that maximizes energy efficiency so as to
reduce their usage and insulate themselves against future price
spikes.21° Companies are also pouring money into research. Over
the next decade, ExxonMobil will spend $100 million on climate
change research at Stanford.211 General Motors is spending
$500,000 on a Duke program designed to create fuel cells that run
on hydrogen.21 2 A Columbia University scientist funded by private
donors is working with engineers to develop technology that aims
to capture carbon dioxide from the air and store it in underground
boulders, preventing the atmospheric accumulation that results in
global warming.211 Whether a relatively easy technological solution
to the global climate change problem will emerge, however, remains
speculative.
Industry lobby predictions that significant economy-wide
emissions reductions are cost prohibitive must be viewed in context.
Lee Iacocca claimed that the proposed Clean Air Act of 1970 would
shut down the U.S. automobile production industry.21' During
congressional debates over acid rain control legislation in the late
1980s, the National Association of Manufacturers predicted
"'serious and lasting damage to the economy'" that would make the
United States a second-class industrial power by the year 2000.215
The automobile industry also claimed that raising fuel efficiency
standards to forty miles per gallon "would devastate the industry,
putting 300,000 auto workers out of their jobs."21' This job loss
statistic was computed by adding the number of employees
manufacturing cars with fuel capacities below forty miles per
gallon.217 It therefore assumed that the industry would essentially
shut down rather than build cars in compliance with new stan-
209. See Fialka & Ball, supra note 198.
210. See id.
211. Regalado & Ball, supra note 88.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. JOHN R.E. BLIESE, THE GREENING OF CONSERVATIVE AMERICA 21 (2001).
215. Id. (quoting EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1999)).
216. See id.
217. See id.
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dards.218 Hence, when would-be regulated companies report
devastating costs associated with compliance, it is wise to examine
the methodology used to assess those costs with a critical eye.
CONCLUSION
When the United States joins the international community and
moves toward genuine compliance with the UNFCCC, the rest of
the developed world will be at a far more advanced stage in tackling
climate change and adapting to its challenges. Although the
atmosphere cannot differentiate between major and minor carbon
emitters, nations of the world and their markets are more
discerning. By failing to meet its obligation as a developed nation
and UNFCCC signatory to be a leader in the mitigation of
anthropogenic climate change, the United States may face both
legal and economic repercussions from the global community. But
all hope is not lost. For better or worse, the United States has
genuine concerns about the intentions and ramifications of the
Kyoto Protocol. Developing a workable domestic alternative that
could later be synthesized with an existing international agreement
or used to create a new multilateral regime may be a realistic
solution to the impasse. 9
At the least, it is critical that the United States comply with the
soft, general commitments it undertook in the UNFCCC to adopt
policies and measures aimed at reducing emissions to 1990 levels.220
This means at least negligibly lowering total net greenhouse gas
emissions. Hoping to reduce emissions intensity-the percentage
increase of emissions in relation to the percentage increase of
GDP-by voluntary actions is insufficient as a matter of law. The
effort must result in an overall emissions decrease, not a continued
increase, in order to comply with the UNFCCC. Funding additional
research into climate science while continuing to increase emissions
is a policy fundamentally out of compliance with the nation's legal
obligations under the UNFCCC. It is a question of direction, and
good-faith movement toward net emissions reductions may be
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, U.S. CLIMATE POLICY AFTER KYOTO: ELEMENTS FOR
SUCCESS 6 (2002).
220. See UNFCCC, supra note 45, art. 4, para. 2.
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necessary to guarantee a place in future multilateral negotiations,
some of which may contain "members only"-type markets attractive
to U.S. businesses.
The consequences expected from global climate change only
become clearer and more imminent with the passage of time. A
technological cure that will end America's obligation to regulate
carbon dioxide and wash away fears of climate change has yet to
arrive. There is, however, no incentive to spur technology like
necessity. Charging fees for the right to pollute may provide that
inspiration. For now, market-based cap-and-trade programs are the
dominant environmental regulatory regime. Without a doubt, the
value of carbon credits acquired today will skyrocket in coming
decades. Industry would be wise to begin carbon credit acquisition,
diversification, and efficiency programs now so as to be at a
competitive advantage when the inevitable occurs. It remains too
early to conclude whether regulations will first be implemented
according to standards set by domestic law, international law, or
the law of the market, but it is clear that the atmosphere's ills will
not, ceteris paribus, self-cure.
Shari L. Diener*
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